The aim of this book can be best described as a defense of a particular view about epistemic justification called semantico-epistemic holism. The skeptical work that justification of empirical claims is impossible is taken into account and concluded that transcendental arguments are unsuccessful in rebutting it. Hence another alternative, viz., semantico-epistemic coherentism is developed primarily in later Wittgensteinian lines, the underlying idea being the interrelatedness of semantic and epistemic issues which ultimately leads to the conclusion that as an account of justification it is more acceptable than its rivals. To set forth this, the rival views such as foundationalism, purely epistemic coherentism, verificationism, and Davidsonianism are evaluated and criticized.
David Grünberg at present is a professor of philosophy at METU, Ankara. He co-authored the books Mantık Terimleri Sözlüğü [Dictionary of Terms of Logic], Metafizik [Metaphysics], and Bilim Felsefesi [Philosophy of Science] as well as co-edited the book Language, Logic and Empirical Knowledge. He also published more than forty articles in journals.
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LAP LAMBERT Academic Publishing
transcendental argument, verification principle, Semantic, Epistemic, semantico-epistemic, meaning, understanding, EPISTEMIC JUSTIFICATION
POLITICAL SCIENCE / General